In a series of essays since the publication of his Dewey Lectures, •Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory•, Rawls has sought to clarify certain ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with his conception of 'justice as faimess' . Yet, despite these efforts, interpreters remain deeply divided about the significance of the later essays, especially for the kind of justification he now claims to offer for bis "political, not metaphysical" conception. On the one band, there are those who emphasize the pragmatic and even relativist features of those essays. Some of these, such as Richard Rorty, regard this turn as a gain, while others, including 'moral realists', regard it as a weakness and unnecessary concession in his theory. 1 On the other band, there are a number of commentators who dismiss this teading and see Rawls's more recent essays as offering a stronger (perhaps even mildly Kantian) defense of an egalitarian liberalism with reference to a model of practical reason and, more specificaUy, the (counterfactual and, hence, regulative) idea of a reasonable agreement between free and equal moral persons. 2 In attempting to assess the merits of these competing interpretations, much will depend on how one understands Rawls's claim to be offering a 'constructivist' account of justice as fairness. lt will also be necessary to clarify what it Fora sympathetic relativist reading, see Richard Rorty 1991 ; .for similar interpretations, but ones which criticize this turn, see David Brink 1989 , Alan Gilbert 1990 , Jean Hampton 1989 and Joscph Raz 1990 . 2 See, for example, Samuel Freeman 1990; , Charles Larmorc 1990 , and Joshua Cohen forthcoming. Onora O'Neill in 1989 provides a useful overview ofboth interpretations of Rawls. means for bis account to be "political, not metaphysical" while still not being "political in the wrong way" -that is, a mere "consensus politics" in wbich principles of justice are accommodated to the dominant interests and power relations of the status quo (see Rawls 1989, 234) . Finally, attempting to decide between these two positions will also require relating Rawts's remark that the task of justification is a practical task aimed at a 'reasonable agreement' that replaces the search for truth to other remarks he makes about the use of • free public reason • and to the claim that the conception does not depend for its validity on a de facto consensus. In short, it will require an interpretation of the following summary of bis justificatory strategy:
"What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our bistory and the traditions embedded in our pubtic life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better basic charter for our social world. Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept.
• (Rawls 1975, 519) Relativist readings emphasize the view that the justification of principles now depends on finding an 'overlapping consensus' conceming our common selfunderstandings, traditions, and public tife; stronger readings, by contrast, draw attention to the conception of 'moral objectivity' as a 'reasonable' agreement that all could accept from a 'suitably constructed' point of view. My own view, which I will attempt to defend in the following essay, is that the tension tbat exists between these two interpretations does not simply result from a superficial juxtaposition of isolated texts, but in fact reflects a deep ambiguity in Rawts's own position that can in turn be traced back to a tension inherent in Kant's account of morality. Kant, it will be recalled, maintained that bis formulation of the moral taw did not contain anything that could not already be found in ordinary morat consciousness. 3 At the same time, he held that the categorical imperative (in its various formulations) -as the 'supreme principle' of pure practical reason -could be derived from an analysis of the conditions of practical agency and was, as such, binding on all (finite) rational agents (see Hili 1989; Reath 1989; Allison 1986 ). Rawls, I want to suggest, plays on a similar ambivalence, at times claiming that bis conception merely articulates or makes more perspicuous notions already present in ordinary moral experience and, at other times, offering a stronger claim that it can be grounded in a (normative) account of practical agency or the basic capacities for moral reasoning and deliberation. I will pursue this thesis by first identifying more precisely the important rote performed by the model-conception of the person (as part of the model-conception of the wellordered society) within Rawls's conception, especially as this is developed in "Kantian Constructivism". I will then consider the relation of this conception of the person to Rawls's more recent claim tbat bis account is "political, not metapbysical". Finally, I will suggest tbat Rawls's constructivist account will only be attractive, that is, not "political in tbe wrong way", if it is developed in the direction of a reflexive or recu.rsive justification of our basic capacities for moral reasoning or practical deliberation. 4 In "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" Rawls identifies three different points of view wbicb are important for a proper understanding of his argument: "that of the parties in the original position; tbat of citizens in a well-ordered society; and, finally, that of ourselves -you and me wbo are examining justice as faimess as a basis for a conception of justice tbay may yield a suitable understanding of freedom and equality" (Rawls 1975, 533; see diagram) . Tbe first two points of view occur within the theory of justice itself: on tbe one band, there is the ideal of the well-ordered society and, as part of this ideal, tbe modelconception of tbe person as a free and equal moral being; on the other band, there is wbat Rawls calls tbe "mediating conception" of the original position: it is a "device of representation" that mediates between the ideals contained in the description of the well-ordered society and tbe definition of tbe principles of justice. Roughly stated, for its cbaracterization we Iook primarily to tbe ideal of tbe well-ordered society; at tbe same time, it belps to make vivid to us wby tbe ideals contained in the well-ordered society, wben combined in a suitable way, yield the two principles of justice. Finally, tbere is tbe position of us wbo bave the task of finding principles of justice for our society (Rawls 1975, 518 and 533 ). Rawls's differentiation among 'tbe three points of view is crucial for an understanding of his justificatory strategy. The description of tbe well-ordered society (togetber with its ideal of tbe person), and the cbaracterization of the original position, as well as tbe specific principles of justice, must all cobere with "our considered judgments upon due reflection", tbat is, tbey must all agree with those judgments at whicb we would arrive as a result of carrying out the process of reflective equilibrium. The entire procedure is constructivist or non-foundationalist in that it does not accept any intuitions as indubitable and does not begin witb tbe assumption tbat tbere are first principles that somebow exist prior to and independently of our conception of ourselves as free and equal moral persons. Ratber, as David Ricbards bas recently summarized .it, "ethical principles do not track special properties in the world, but are tbe expression and acknowledgement of our common moral powers of rationality and reasonableness" (Ricbards 1988, 120) . The principles of justice are the result of a process of construction in whicb, from 'our' point of view, various ideals or model-conceptions are articulated whicb are subsequently used in tbe construction or design of tbe original position. The parties in the original position, as agents of construction, then select the principles of justice from a Iist of alternative conceptions. Finally, each of these 'points of view' can serve as a corrective to considerations and features 4 I develop this idea of a reflexive or recursive justification at greater length in my 1992a.
introduced in the other; no one perspective is taken as fixed or absolute, although, at the end, the results must be acceptable to us as citizens faced with the task of finding principles of justice. This brief summary of the three points of view and its importance for Rawls's justificatory strategy underscores the centrat rote assumed in bis theory by the model-conception of the well-ordered society and, in particular, the model-conception of the person. In fact, as I shall argue, the original position, as a 'device of representation', acquires whatever justificatory force it has because it adequately mirrors or modelstheideals specified in the model-conceptions. Rawls cites four distinct features that combine to make up the model-conception of the well-ordered society as a self-sufficient system of social cooperation for mutual advantage. s First, a well-ordered society is one that is "effectively regulated by a public conception of justice" (Rawls 1971, 453; 1975, 537) . This means (a) that each citizen accepts, and knows that others aecept, the same conception of justice (whatever it tums out to be); (b) that the basic institutions of the society satisfy this conception of justice and are with good reason believed by everyone to satisfy it; and (c) that this public conception of justice is based upon reasonable beliefs established by widely-accepted methods of inquiry (i.e., it does not presuppose controversial metaphysical or religious doctrines), (Rawls 1971, 454; 1975, 537) .
Kantian
Second, citizens in a well-ordered society are, and recognize themselves as being, free and equal moral persons (Rawls 1971, 505; 1975, 525) . Rawls calls this feature the "model-conception of the person". Although it is present in A Theory of Justice, there is no doubt that it has become more prominent in his later writings, especially to counter those interpretations that view the earlier work as an attempt to ground principles of justice in a neutral (game-theoretical) conception of rational choice. Since this model-conception is central to my own interpretation, I will outline its three most important features more fully.
(a) Citizens in the well-ordered society are characterized as having two basic moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice, that is, "the capacity to understand, to apply and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice"; and "the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good" (Rawls 1975, 525; 1971, 505) . In ascribing the first moral power to citizens in the well-ordered society, it is assumed that whatever the appropriate conception of justice tums out to be citizens are capable of being effectively motivated by it. The second moral power suggests that citizens have their own conceptions of the good which motivate them and give them a sense of purpose or worth in life. However, citizens arenot viewed a5 being permanently attached to any one conception of the 'good; rather, they are considered capable of changing their ends and ideals at various times in their life, and the recognition of this capacity to revise their conception of the good is an important feature of their characterization as moral persons.
(b) Citizens are equal in that "they each have, and view themselves as having, a right to equal respect and consideration in determining the principles by which the basic arrangements of their society are to be regulated". 6 This notion of the s For Rawls's discussion of the notion of a well-ordered society, see Rawls 1971, 453-62; Rawls 1975, 521-22; and 1974 esp. pp. 633-37 ; in order to emphasize the continuity between Rawls 1971 and 1975, I will cite references to both of these in the text. equality of citizens in determining the principles of justice is more fundamental than (and the basis for) other ideals of equality tbat are realized witbin tbe basic structure of society (e.g. , formal equality before the law, equality of opportunity with respect to powers and offices defined by tbe social structure, etc.). lt is based on their common status as moral beings.
(c) · NMht.WiQ~tai~ t.ajO\ ~ fJ ~·First , each is viewed as ~~ rwiat ~ot:the ifeed (Rawls 1971 , 505; 1975, 544) . This repeats the second moral power noted above. lt also reflects Rawls's liberal commitment to a plurality of conceptions of the good and bis belief that principles of justice should not rely upon any particular conception of the good, but upon a conception of the person (as a free and equal moral being). Thus, it parallels Kant's attempt to distinguish between the moral agent and the ends to which she might be attached at any given time. Second, citizens~in·~~,· ~d recQIIlize one aootber"'''S' beiftg, •8C5ff;öfiginatilat~-::aii valiclidlia~ (Rawls 1975, 543) . This follows directly from the view that there is a plurality of conceptions of the good, alt of whicb are acceptable so long as they are pursued within the Iimits of justice. FinaiJy, citizens are free in that they recognize one another as being responsible for their ends or conceptions of the good. Finally, the third and fourth features of the model-conception of the weUordered society primarily refer to the background conditions and arrangement of its institutions. Rawls assumes tbat even in a well-ordered society the •circumstances ofjustice• will obtain (Rawls 1971, 126 and 1975, 525) . 8 Even in a wellordered society it is assumed that moderate scarcity will persist since it is unlikely that there will be enough natural and social resources to satisfy every Iegitimale demand. This is due in part to the ·subjective• circumstance that in a wellordered society there will still be a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good witbin the Iimits of justice. Finally, a well-ordered society is said to be stable with respect to its conception of justice (Rawls 1971, 454; 1975, 522) . "This means that, viewing the society as an ongoing concem, its members ac-7 Rawls discusses this aspect of the person as free in his 1982, 169; for a careful discussion ofthis question, see Scanlon 1975 and Buchanan 1975. 8 In response to severa1 Marxist objections (notably, MacPherson) Rawls no Ionger insists upon the objective circumstance of justice (Rawls 1975, 539) ; however, even with the advances of technology and science (and the freeing of production for the satisfaction of generalized interests) there is no guarantee that moderate scarcity can be overcome given the plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. quire as they grow up a sufficiently strong and effective sense of justice, one that usually overcomes the temptations and Stresses of sociallife." (Rawls 1974, 634) In "Kantian Constructivism" the description and design of the original position is then developed with reference to these features of the well-ordered society. Each element of construction in the original position is defended by showing how it appropriately models or represents the model-conceptions. Thus, the veil of ignorance, the various formal constraints on cboice, and the symmetry and rationality of the parties are defended with reference to the four features cited. Similarly, the Iist of primary social goods and the restriction of deliberation to the basic social structure are defended with reference to the model-conception of the person and the two basic moral powers (see especially Rawls 1982) . For our own purposes, the point worth stressing again is that the original position does not reflect an allegedl y neutral, 'game-theoretical' model of rational choice, but reflects more explicitly normative assumptions as a modeling of the ideals specified by the model-conceptions.
In "Kantian Constructivism" Rawls also suggests that the four features of the well-ordered society can be united under "the Reasonable" and "the Rational" tenns of social cooperation. (These two notions correspond closely to Kant's distinction between Vernunft and Verstand.) Social cooperation is Reasonable since it incorporates the ideals of mutuality and reciprocity (Rawls 1975, 528) : All who cooperate reasonably share in tbe benefits and burdens as established by principles agreed to from an appropriate perspective, namely, the perspective of citizens regarded as free and equal moral persons. The notion of the Reasonable is also connected to the notion of a citizen as fully autonomous, that is, as baving the capacity to act from a sense of justice and bis right to equal consideration in determining principles for the regulation of the basic structure. The tenns of social cooperation are "Rational" since they allow for "each participant's rational advantage, what, as individuals, they are trying to advance" (Rawls 1975, 528) . This is reflected in the person's second basic moral power, the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good, as weil as the commitment to a plurality of such conceptions within the Iimits of justice. In a rather elegant passage, Rawls clarifies the relationship between the Reasonable and the Rational in a weU-ordered society:
"The Reasonable presupposes and subordinates the Rational. lt defines the fair tenns of cooperation acceptable to all within some group of separately identifiable persons, each of whom possesses and can exercise the two moral powers. All have a conception of their good wtiich defines their rational advantage, and everyone has a normally effective sense of justice; a capacity to honor the fair tenns of cooperation. The Reasonable presupposes the Rational, because, without conceptions of the good that move members of the group, there is no point to social cooperation nor to notions of right and justice, even though such cooperation realizes values that go beyond what conceptions of the good specify taken alone. The
Reasonable subordinates the Rational because its principles Iimit, and in a Kantian doctrine Iimit absolutely, the final ends that can be pursued." (Rawls 1975, 530) 25
The description and design of the original position can also be seen as expressing the ideals of the Reasonable and the Rational (see diagram). The Rational is exhibited primarily in the rational autonomy of the parties and the adoption of the maximin rule. The Reasonable, by contrast, is expressed in the formal constraints, the veil of ignorance, the symmetry conditions, the Iist of primary goods, and the designation of the basic structure as the subject of justice. Thus, just as the design of the original position models the ideals of the modelconception, it can also be seen as expressing the notions of the Reasonable and the Rational as complementary aspects of our capacity for moral deliberation. The reason why the principles hypothetically chosen by the parties in the original position are binding on us is because as a 'device of representation' it adequately mirrors our basic moral powers and thus models ideals it would be unreasonable for us to reject. lt now remains to be seen how this account of the original position (and thus the selection of bis two principles) which emphasizes the modelconception of the person and our basic moral powers is related to Rawls's more recent emphasis on bis account as a political conception. · In "Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical" Rawls suggests that the account of justice as faimess developed in A Theory of Justice and subsequent essays is misunderstood if it is seen as part of a more general moral theory or philosophical approach (in the way, for example, one might regard utilitarianism or Kantian moral theory). Though some passages in the earlier writings may encourage such a reading, in this essay Rawls argues that bis account is offered as a political conception. This means that the conception is limited in the scope of its application to what Rawls calls the "basic structure" of society. More importantly, however, it means that its justification does not appeal to "general and comprehensive" moral, religious or philosophical doctrines that are bound tobe controversial in a society characterized by the "fact of pluralism," but relies instead on "fundamental intuitive ideas" (including the model-conception of the person) implicit in the public culture of a democratic society. Rawls describes this strategy as the "method of avoidance" and considers it to be simply the extension of the principle of (religious) toleration to the aims of political philosophy itself: we prescind from controversial metaphysical or philosophical doctrines in order to find a practicable solution to the long-standing disputes conceming social justice that still beset liberal democratic regimes. The idea is to remove deeply controversial moral and religious issues from the political agenda so that a common basis can be gained for finding principles of justice and defining constitutional essentials. As Rawls puts it, "the question is: what is the least that must be asserted; and if it must be asserted, wbat is ifs least controversial form?* 9
On one interpretation of bis work, referred to in my opening remarks, this construal of tbe *metbod of avoidance* is central to Rawls's understanding of tbe political. What be now refers to as tbe *domain of tbe political* is cbaracterized, from a socio~ultural perspective, in terms of certain basic or fundamental ideas and self-understandings latent in tbe public culture. 10 The idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens is the most important of tbese, but other self-understandings are drawn from this idea of tbe political as weil. For example, tbe assumption tbat citizens are able to distinguisb between values they hold in connection witb comprebensive religious and metapbysical (or philosophical) doctrines and those 'very great political values' associated witb tbe idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and tbat, wben a conflict arises, citizens give priority to the latter helps to delineate the domain of the political (see Rawls 1988, 275; 1989, 243 and Galston 1989, 717) . So too does tbe assumption that citizens are able to disti. nguisb between tbeir *public" and "nonpublic" (or "moral") identities.' 1 Rawls's socio~ultural characterization of tbe political also includes a fairly specific understanding of the use of "free public reason" and idea of a reasonable agreement between free and equal citizens: The principles of justice which are to regulate tbe basic structure must be justified not only witb reference to modes of inquiry and rules for assessing evidence tbat are publicly recognized, but also on grounds tbat it is reasonable for all to accept in view of tbeir "common human reason" and *tbe criteria and procedures of common sense knowledge" (Rawls 1989, 236 and 244) .
It is important to observe, however, that on the first interpretation I have proposed even these further self-understandings are drawn from and -in a crucial sense -constrained by the "fundamental intuitive ideas" contained in tbe "overlapping consensus•. According to Rawls, it would be contrary to tbe aims of a political conception of justice -that is, one tbat applied tbe principle of toleration to itself -if the justification of these ideas were pursued otberwise. For example, the characterization of the scope and constraints implicit in tbe idea of a reasona-ble agreement between free and equal persons is not itself clarified reflexively or recursively in relation to a more general analysis of the requirements of practical reason, but is made to depend upon the fundamental ideas latent in our public culture. 12 Wbereas the fonner strategy (pursued by Kant and, more recently, Habermas) is "metaphysical" or philosophical in a manner Rawls wishes to avoid, the latter contributes to a "political, not metaphysical" characterization of the domain of the political. · However, this first interpretation, which is closest to relativist readings such as Rorty's, faces serious cballenges from within Rawls's own texts. It does not provide a way for distinguishing (as Rawls wishes to do) between principles that rest simply on a de facto consensus conceming fundamental intuitive ideas and the correct account (Rawls 1989, 250) . Similarly, insofar as it suggests that the best account of the conception of justice simply reflec.ts the sbared understandings of a political culture, it leaves unexplained Rawls's concem tbat a political conception not be "political in the wrong way". lt also neglects Rawls's recent remark tbat tbe idea of an overlapping consensus comes into play only at tbe second stage in the exposition of bis conception of justice, that is, as part of tbe response to the question of the stability of his conception after it has already been articulated as a "free-standing political conception" (Rawls 1989, 234) . Finally, it would seem to play down the significance of Rawls's constructivist account of objectivity (in Rawls 1975 ) and the related notion of justification as a reasonable agreement between free and equal persons.
In the second interpretation, also referred to in my opening remarks, the model-conceptioo of the person is not simply a fundamental intuitive idea latent in our public culture. More importantly, in this account, the model-cooception of the person and the basic moral powers are takeo to be the best (most correct) account of ou. r capacities for practical reason. The focus is not oo the shared content of a political culture, but oo the citizen's moral powers or capacities for practical deliberation. On tbis interpretation, the relation between the 'method of avoidance' and the account of practical reasoning is thereby reversed. That is, rather than limiting the ideal of the person and the basic moral powers to wbat is contained within an overlapping consensus, wbat it is reasonable for us to assume and wbere one can expect reasonable disagreement to continue must also depend, among other things, oo the best account that can be given of our basic moral powers as weU as on the real possibilities for their effective exercise in light of the idea of 'free public reason' (see below). This reading bas the advantage of providing a means for distinguishing betweeo a de facto and a normative consensus. lt would also enable Rawls to explain how bis conception migbt not be "political in the wrong way".
In the tbird part of "Kantian Constructivism" Rawls considers bis constructivist account of moral objectivity. Principles of justice are correct not because tbey are true (in tbe sense that they correspond to an independent moral order) but because tbey are ones that would be agreed to by all if viewed from a "suitably constructed social point of view" (Rawls 1975, 554) . This constructed social point of view is, of course, the original position, and what makes it "suitable" is that it appropriately mirrors or represents the model conception of the person as a free and equal citizen with two basic moral powers. Or, to state the same point differently, it is suitable because it appropriately ~odels both the "rational" and the "reasonable" features of our basic moral capacities. At times, Rawls describes tbis constructivist account of objectivity, in a manner consistent with bis "method of avoidance," as indifferent to realist and anti-realist debates. More often, however, he contrasts constructivism to "rational intuitionism" and thereby suggests that he is not simply sidestepping tbis controversy, but proposing bis own alternative account of moral objectivity (see Brinks discussion in bis 1989, 303ff.). A strong reason for preferring tbe second position is that it fits better with bis account of "free public reason" and responds more appropriately to tbe need for a public basis of justification for political principles.
The idea of free public reason, Rawls suggests, is an "essential companion" of a (>9litical conception of justice (Rawls 1987, 8) . lt specifies not only that specific "guidelines of inquiry and publicly recognized rules of assessing evidence be used" and that tbe virtues of reasonableness and fair-mindedness be adhered to, but also, and perhaps most importantly, that any acceptable principles of justice conform to the "idea of publicity" (Rawls 1987, 8) . This last condition, wbich echoes Kant's "transeendental principle of publicity, • reads as follows: "Publicity ensures, so far as the feasible design of institutions can allow, that free and equal persons are in a position to know and to accept the background social influences tbat shape tbeir conception of tbemselves as persons, as weil as tbeir character and conception of tbeir good. Being in tbis position is a precondition of freedom; it means that nothing is or need be bidden.
•l3
The idea of free public reason requires that the justification of political principles appeal only to norms, values, and ideals that citizens, in view of their conception of themselves as free and equal persons with two basic moral powers, could reasonably be expected to accept. Any defacto agreement may fail to meet this requirement since it makes reference to certain ideal conditions wbich may not have been satisfied. 1t presents, as a test of legitimacy, the counterfactual ideal of a reasonable agreement between free and equal persons.
This idea of publicity and the related requirement that acceptable principles of justice must be capable of public justification is not a free-floating constraint arbitrarily introduced by Rawls. lt is, he claims, already implicit in the first moral power outlined above -the capacity for a sense of justice -and is thus connected with our basic capacities for practical deliberatioJ1. This moral power (together with the "highest-order interest" in its realization) • ... implies a regulative desire to conform the pursuit of one's good, as weil as the demands one makes on others, to public principles of justice which all can reasonably be expected to accept. " 14 In a careful and instructive analysis, Samuel Freeman describes this feature of our moral powers as "answerability": "Answerability implies more than being held accountable (responsible) for one's acts. lt means that we (or someone in our stead) be able publicly to justifiy our conduct, aims, and expectations on· terms others could freely accept. " 15 According to the second interpretation of Rawls I am proposing, "answerability" isafundamental component of our moral personality or capacity for practical deliberation and, as such, assumes priority over other ends and aspirations we may have.
Further, in addition to the idea of publicity and account of answerability, there is yet another "requirement of reason" which can be inferred from Rawls's model-conception of the person. In describing various "precepts of reasonable discussion", Rawls says that we should also be prepared to recognize the "burdens of reason" and to accept that there will be many issues on which even reasonable people may disagree (Rawls 1989, 238) . In view of the "obvious sources of reasonable disagreement", such as conflicting evidence, the indeterminacy of many of our concepts, alternative modes of assessment, and "limited social space", Rawls argues that it is unreasonable to expect that public discussion will produce a wide-ranging agreement even among reasonable people. lt is important to note, however, that this constraint is not simply a concession to the status quo, but is itself a requirement of reason. Furthermoie, at least in certain limiting cases, whether or not disagreement on a particular issue is reasonable cannot be decided solely by appeal to intuitive ideas and common sense (as might be supposed on the first interpretation above), but can only be determined in a public discussion (or, more precisely, in a series of overlapping and institutionally structured public discussions) in which all those affected have an opportunity to participate and all relevant considerations and perspectives are taken into view. 16 In view of these "requirements of reason" inferred from our basic moral powers, it is clear that Rawls's model-conception of the person entails a fairly rieb (and controversial) account of practical agency. lt is, for example, at odds with Humean or "desire-based" accounts of practical reason since it assumes that the agent has fundamental interests which are not directly tied to (contingent) objects of desireY Rather, we are assumed to possess, as part of our deeper motivational structure, two "highest-order" interests -namely, interests in reali.zing the two basic moral powers (Rawls 1975, 525) . Like primary desires, these interests can also be "action-guiding" in that they are taken to be "supremely regulative" for other aims we may have. However, since they presuppose the idea of a public justification they may be called "principle-dependent" (Freeman 1991, 292; seealso Scanlon 1988, 173) : They reflect our capacity and willingness to act on norms or principles that could not reasonably be rejected by others as a basis for general agreement. They also represent what Kant called an "interest of reason" since they refer not to the objects of desire, but to our basic capacities for practical deliberation.
If we inquire about the justification of this model of practical agency, however, Rawls faces a difficulty similar to that encountered by Kant: He must not only show that the model-conception and its implicit "requirements of reason" reflect a particular model of practical agency, but also that this model of agency is somehow appropriately binding on us. Within the framework of bis constructivist account of moral objectivity, the direction bis response must take to this difficulty seems clear: The model-conception of the person is not simply a ~fundamental intuitive idea" latent in our public culture, but is, so to speak, reflexively or recursively grounded in the ongoing practice of public justification. That is, the model-conception is not simply an account that we would recognize after due reflection in a condition of reflective equilibrium, it is also an account of the basic moral capacities that we-those of us who occupy the "third point of view" -mustalready be assumed to possess as free and equal persons engaged in a process of justification. lt is, in other words, not just one possible account of our self-conception, but the best account that can be given of the basic capacities presupposed by tbe practice of justification in which we are involved as co-deliberators. On this account, what Kant described as the necessity of acting "under the idea of freedom" may be seen as having been replaced with the necessity of acting "under tbe idea of providing justification" (Kant 1922, 448) . Under this idea, the account of practical agency becomes intelligible; outside this idea, the very notion of actingfor a reason seems threatened.
These two competing interpretations of the significance of Rawls's political conception of justice are, I hope to have shown, not simply the result of an obvious or willful misreading by one side or the other. Rather, they reflect a deeper tension in Rawls's own project itself reminiscent of a profound ambiguity in Kant's moral theory. I believe that the project outlined in the second interpretation will finally prove to be the more promising. But, in view of the controversy that persists over the interpretation of Rawls's later essays, it is clear that
